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Abstract 
 This study aims to identify the joint determinants of leverage and 
dividend policy of non-financial firms in Pakistan and India. For analysis 
purpose, the data is gathered from the annual reports of companies from 
India and Pakistan during years 2010-2014. Multiple regression analysis is 
used on reduced form equations to see the impact of variables on dividend 
policy and leverage of the firms. Literature from finance indicates that 
liquidity, profitability, tangible assets, institutional ownership of firm and 
firm size, all affect the decisions regarding leverage and dividend payment.  
Regression results are used to see the effect of these variables and compare 
them with theories from finance. The results indicate that only size of the 
firm positively impacts the decision to take additional debt, while all other 
variables have negative effect on debt policy. From second regression, both 
profitability and liquidity negatively impact dividend policy while remaining 
variables impact it positively. Additionally, only liquidity of a firm jointly 
determines both leverage and dividend policy. 
 
Keywords: Capital structure, dividend policy, nonfinancial firms, Pakistan, 
India 
 
Introduction 
 Capital Structure of a firm refers to different ways it finances its 
assets. A firm may invite general public and institutions to invest in its assets 
by purchasing its shares which is called equity. On other hand, a firm may 
issue bonds or ask banks for debt to meet its financial requirements which is 
called leverage; the proportion of leverage in the capital structure is called 
leverage policy. Dividend policy of a firm is the decision of firm managers 
about the payment of dividends to shareholders out of cash surplus.  Joint-
determinants of leverage and dividend policy are firm specific factors 
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impacting jointly on both leverage and dividend policy. There are many 
factors which jointly affect capital structure and dividend policy of the firms 
for example profitability, liquidity,firm’s size, asset tangibility etc. This 
research explores the joint factors for nonfinancial firms of India and 
Pakistan. Non-financial firms are firms producing non-financial goods thus 
excluding financial services and banking sector. 
 
Objective and significance of research 
 The motivation to do research comes from current theoretical debate 
in corporate finance about optimal capital structure of the firm and its 
determinants as well as factors influencing dividend payout policy of the 
firm. It will be interesting to note which factors separately determine capital 
structure and dividend payout of the firm and this research addresses that 
question. The other objective of this research is to attempt to explain the joint 
determinants of capital structure and dividend payout of the firm. That is 
which factors jointly determine both capital structure and dividend payout of 
the firm. The research is expected to generate a lot of interest amongst 
financial researchers as it opens up new research vista in the field of applied 
finance. It will provide insight to financial manager about inter-relationship 
between leverage and dividend policy so that he could come up with optimal 
policies. This inquiry will help academics and practitioners to observe 
different approaches of firms towards leverage and dividend policies. It is 
important to decipher the complex relationship between capital structure and 
dividend payout policy for the firms and investors to understand different 
decisions they will be taking in ever changing financial environment. I am 
hopeful that the empirical research will give us a lead to build on the already 
existing literature on the subject or it will add a new dimension to it.  
 
Problem statement and research question. 
 I have conducted this empirical study in order to gauge which 
variables affect dividend payment and leverage of the firm. In the light of 
finance theories, I will measure the individual impact of each variable 
separately on both the capital structure and dividend payment and see if the 
variables are indeed significant or not. Then in the next step I will figure out 
those variables which jointly affect dividend payment and leverage of the 
firm. Therefore, my research questions are; 1) which variables affect 
dividend payment and leverage of firm? 2) What are the joint determinants 
of leverage and dividend payment of the firm? 
 
Literature review 
 Modigliani and Miller are the two pioneer investigators of Capital 
Structure and dividend irrelevance theories. It is proposed in Modigliani and 
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Miller (1958) that in a perfect market the capital structure is not relevant to 
the value of the firm. In the paper of Modigliani and Miller (1963), tax has 
been added to the model and it is argued that the higher leverage in capital 
structure would increase firm’s value as interest is non-taxable. Miller and 
Modigliani (1961) proposed that in a perfect market the dividend policy 
exerts no impact on firm’s value. After the investigation of above three 
papers lot of work has been done on both capital structure and dividend 
policy with consideration of imperfect market. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) gave agency theory and made another 
valuable contribution to financial literature. The agency theory advocates 
conflict of interest between investors and managers. Managers pursue their 
own benefits by taking financial decisions and disregard the interests of 
investors. This conflict leads to the agency costs like monitoring cost and 
bankruptcy cost. Rozeff (1982), Easterbrook (1984) and Bhaduri (2002) gave 
arguments that both dividend payments and debt are used to reduce more 
cash flows under the supervision of management so both can be used to 
reduce agency costs. The agency theory explains institutional ownership, 
asset tangibility and liquidity could affect decisions related to capital 
structure and dividend policy. Donaldson (1961) draws attention towards a 
particular order followed by firms while making their financial decisions. 
Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) further developed the pecking 
order theory. This theory advocates that a particular order is followed by 
firms while making financing or investment decisions on the basis of costs of 
financing sources. Retained earnings are the least costly source of financing 
and then come the debt, while equity is the most costly source of financing 
after debt. This order is followed by firms as they don’t want to pass up 
growth opportunities. The companies may pay dividends after meeting their 
investment requirements. This theory suggests profitability is an important 
factor to consider while devising capital structure and dividend policy. The 
work of Modigliani and Miller (1961) drew attention for the first time that 
the dividend payments work as a signaling device for the firm. Bhattachariya 
(1980) explained that firms use dividend payments to reduce information gap 
between investors and managers. Ross (1977) contributed to the concept that 
debt also plays a role of signaling device about good financial health of a 
firm. Institutional ownership and profitability are the two factors that could 
influence capital structure and dividend policy. Bankruptcy theory advocates 
that a firm may face bankruptcy costs due to non-payment of debt: direct 
costs like legal and accounting costs related to transfer of ownership and 
restructuring of capital structure; indirect costs like unavailability of growth 
opportunities due to interruption of relations with suppliers and customers. 
From this perspective firm’s size is an important factor to consider while 
making decisions related to capital structure and dividend policy. 
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Large number of empirical studies has examined capital structure and 
dividend policy in various countries, for example Ozkan (2001); his results 
are consistent with the pecking order theory. In order to approach profitable 
opportunities, the firm will prefer retained earnings. In case of unavailability 
of retained earnings the firm will use debt and then equity. Thus he suggests 
that profitability is negatively related to leverage. Booth et al. (2001) took 
earnings before tax divided by assets as a variable for profitability, he came 
to the same conclusion that profitability is negatively related to debt, 
moreover his study elaborates about the existence of  asymmetric 
information in observed countries. The more profitable the firm is, the fewer 
requirements for external debt. Bhaduri (2002) in his study took cash flow 
over total assets ratio (CF/TA) and cash flow over sales (CF/S) as a factor 
that indicates credit worthiness and quality of the firm. Firm at the lower 
level of profitability would prefer short term debt. Firm’s utilization of long 
term debt increases as the profitability of firm increases. His study examined 
how profitability of a firm influences its decision to take short term or long 
term debt. He saw a positive relation between long term debt and 
profitability of the firm. Most of the researchers found a positive relation of 
profitability with dividend payment. Abdelsalam et al.   (2008) and Patra et 
al. (2012) used return on asset as a variable for profitability and found that 
more profitable firms have good financial health and pay more dividends to 
send a positive message in the market to attract more external capital. Many 
researchers undertook studies to find relation amongst institutional 
ownership, dividend policy and debt. Ahmed and Javid (2009) found a 
positive relation between institutional ownership and dividend policy; 
according to the authors firms with more institutional investors tend to pay 
more dividends as it reduces the agency costs of firms related to the agency 
problem. Al-Najjar (2009) found strong negative relation between 
institutional ownership and dividend policy; he justified his result in 
accordance with signaling theory. Institutional investors and dividend 
payments work as alternative signaling devices to send positive message to 
market about good financial health of firms. Chung (2012) found out a 
strong negative relation of institutional ownership with leverage, he 
explained that both leverage and institutional ownership act as a monitoring 
tools over management performance. MA. Moh’d, et al. (1998) also found a 
strong negative relation between leverage and institutional ownership. They 
justify their results on the basis of agency theory and argue that both 
leverage and institutional ownership are substitutes of each other and act as a 
means to control management of the firm. 
Size of a firm and its impact on leverage is also studied by various 
authors; Rajan and Zingales (1995) took logarithm of net sales as a proxy of 
firm size and found out a positive relation between size and leverage in all 
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Group of 7 (G7) countries. The results of the paper indicate that there is 
positive relation between size and leverage but the authors are not sure that if 
this relation is due to lower probability of default on loans for large firms as 
compared with higher probability of default on loans for smaller ones. He 
argues that there is low cost of financial distress in Japan, and leverage of 
Japanese firms increase with increase in size. On the other hand, in Germany 
there is low liquidation cost yet the small firms are using more debt as 
compared to the large firms. Bhaduri (2002) uses natural log of total assets as 
a proxy for firm size and concludes that firm size is positively related to long 
term debt and negatively related to short term debt, while it has no effect on 
total debt. He explains that large firms use more long term debt while small 
firms use more short term debt because of high transaction costs related to 
long term debt. The creditor will consider favorable to invest in small firms 
for short period as it involves less risk. Patra et al. (2012) uses natural log of 
total assets as a proxy for firm size and shows a positive relation between 
firm size and dividend policy, he argues that large firms with more 
institutional investors have easy access to capital market. As a result large 
firms can afford to pay more dividends. Many authors have tried to identify 
the relation between tangible assets and leverage. Rajan and Zingales (1995) 
argued that tangible assets of a firm can be used as collateral against debt. 
This finding is supported by the agency theory. Similarly, Moh’d, LG. Perry 
and JN. Rimbey (1998) also found a strong positive relation between asset 
tangibility and debt. Many researchers found a negative relation between 
liquidity and leverage. Ozkan (2001) found that liquidity is negatively 
related to leverage and explained that a firm with more liquidity will meet its 
investment requirements easily as compared to a firm with less liquid assets. 
Hence liquidity can be used as a substitute for leverage. Similarly, Naceur et 
al.(2006) found out a significant negative relation between liquidity and 
dividend policy. He explained that in a more liquid market, capital gain is 
more preferable to dividends because market supports more selling of stock.  
 
Underlying Economic Theories   
The underlying theory behind this research is based on the models 
and theories given by researchers elaborating on important variables and 
factors which affect dividend payout and capital structure of the company. 
These theories are agency theory, pecking order theory, signaling theory and 
bankruptcy theory. All these theories play an important role in explaining the 
reasoning behind the factors affecting capital structure and dividend payout 
policy of the firms. A brief explanation of the theories and variables will help 
us further comprehend the basis of the economic model. 
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Agency Theory 
Agency theory tells us about agency problem that exists due to the 
separation of ownership and management in organizations. The Agency 
theory given by Jensen and Meckling (1976) describes the relation between 
the owners and the managers as the relation between the principals and the 
agents. The managers are the agents of owners of the firm and can pursue 
such decisions that increase their own welfare rather than increasing the 
value of the firm. This situation leads to the conflict of interest between the 
owners and the managers of the firm. The agency models of leverage and 
dividend policy foretell that use of debt financing and dividend payments can 
work as tools to tackle with agency problem. According to Rozeff (1982), 
Easterbrook (1984) and Bhaduri (2002), both dividend payments and ability 
to issue debt can decrease the cash flows that are under the control of 
management. Jensen (1986) explains that dividend payments can reduce the 
agency problem through reducing excess cash flows in the organization. 
Reduction in excess cash flow makes cash less available to the managers to 
use for unproductive purposes. From the agency theory perspective, it is 
generally accepted by authors that leverage and dividend policy decisions are 
mainly influenced by institutional ownership, asset tangibility and liquidity. 
 
Pecking Order Theory 
The pecking order theory that was first suggested by Donaldson and 
then developed by Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984), explains that 
because of existence of asymmetric information, the companies follow an 
order while taking decisions about financing. The companies will prefer to 
finance their projects by retained earnings (the least costly source of 
finance); if the investment opportunities are not fully financed by the 
retained earnings then debt (the less costly source of finance) will be 
preferred to equity issues (the most costly source of finance). This order is 
favorable for companies as it reduces the chances of passing up profitable 
opportunities. Further the pecking order theory says that the companies pay 
dividends after meeting the investment requirements.  Profitability and 
liquidity of the firm will be used as a significant factor in leverage and 
dividend policy models. 
 
Signaling Theory 
The signaling theory is based on the concept that there is an 
information asymmetry between managers and the investors of the firm. The 
work of Miller and Modigliani (1961) draws attention that dividend 
payments are signals to the market. If a firm is paying more dividends then it 
is taken as positive signal by the investors and it would appreciate the market 
value of the stock. If a firm is giving fewer dividends then it is taken as 
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negative signal by the investors and it would reduce the market value of the 
firm. The work of Bhattachariya (1980) also explains that the firms use 
dividend payment as a signal to investors about its financial health. Ross 
(1977) contributed to the concept that the issue of debt is also used by the 
investors as a source of information regarding the performance of the firm. 
The investors take the issue of debt by the managers as a positive signal that 
the firm’s profits are high and the mangers do not want to share these high 
profits with outside investors. The firms having good financial performance 
can issue more debt because of the capabilities to repay loan. While the firms 
with poor financial performance issue low level of debt because of low 
capabilities to repay loan. From the signaling theory perspective, institutional 
ownership and profitability of the firm can be used to examine the effect on 
leverage and dividend policy decisions. 
 
Bankruptcy Theory 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) and Modigliani and Miller (1963) are 
the two papers which advocate that the value of the firm, that is the value of 
its common stock and the weighted average cost of capital is irrelevant to its 
capital structure in the absence of market imperfections. While in the real 
world of business, market imperfections exist and bankruptcy costs should 
be taken into account. According to Haugen and Senbet (1978) the size of a 
firm influences how a firm handles bankruptcy costs. Large firms are less 
likely to experience financial distress and have more capacity to repay loans 
as compared to smaller ones. Therefore size of a firm becomes a crucial 
factor while taking decisions regarding leverage and dividend policy 
 
 Variables Affecting Dividend Payout Policy and Capital Structure  
Profitability  
 According to pecking order theory, there exists a negative relation 
between profitability and debt. Firms will use accumulated profits to fulfill 
their finance requirements before taking debt or issuing equity.Firms follow 
this order because the accumulated profit is less expensive mode as 
compared to debt and equity. According to signaling theory profitability of 
the firm is a measure of capacity to pay dividends. The more profitable the 
firm the more capacity to pay dividends while the less profitable the firm the 
less capacity to pay dividends. Firms use dividends to send a positive signal 
in the market about the good financial performance.  
 
Institutional Ownership 
 According to Huddart (1993) and Maug (1998) institutional investors 
play a monitoring role that lessens the intensity of agency problem. The 
institutional owners can oppose the wrong decisions of management and 
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restrict them not to misuse the resources of the firm. According to Jensen 
(1986), debt can serve as a monitoring tool as it engages the managers to 
repay the loan. Hence it can be concluded that institutional ownership is a 
substitute of debt, Grier and Zychowics (1994). This discussion foretells 
negative relation of institutional ownership with leverage. Signaling theory 
foretells negative relation between institutional ownership and dividend 
payments as both are signaling devices. Both are substitute for each other, 
Al-Malkawi (2007), Al-Najjar (2009), Amidu and Abor (2006), Holder et al. 
(1998), Kania and Bacon (2005). 
 
Firm Size 
 According to Bhaduri (2002); Titman and Wessels (1998), Size of a 
firm is one of the main factors while devising capital structure of the firm, 
especially when financing decisions are taken after the consideration of 
transaction costs. There exists a positive relation between size of a firm and 
leverage. The results of Rajan and Zingales (1995) are indicating that there is 
positive relation between size and dividend payout. The large firms can 
easily raise their funds and hence can support large dividend payouts when 
compared to small firms. This argument is supported by Holder et al. (1998), 
Al-Najjar (2009), Eriotis (2005), Al-Malkawi (2007), Ramli (2010), Patra et 
al. (2012) on the basis of agency theory explanations. 
 
Asset Tangibility 
 According to agency theory, managers can invest in inappropriate 
projects, and the firm can raise debt against fixed assets to increase 
monitoring effect over the mangers by the bondholders. Hence a firm with 
more tangible assets can raise more debt. The same arguments are given by 
Rajan and Zingales (1995); Booth et al. (2001) in favour of positive relation. 
According to Aivazian, Booth, and Clearly (2003) markets where main 
source of financing is short term debt the firms with more tangible assets pay 
less dividends as compared to the firms with less tangible assets. Because the 
more tangible assets mean the less current assets, and the less current assets 
means the less possibility that the creditors will lend short term loans. Hence 
it can be concluded that the more tangible assets the less chances of dividend 
payouts. 
 
Liquidity  
 The agency theory addresses negative relationship between liquidity 
and leverage. Firms with more liquid assets can use their liquidity to finance 
investment opportunities instead of taking debt. There is also a negative 
relation between liquidity and dividend payment. In a more liquid market, 
capital gain is more preferable to dividends because market supports more 
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selling of stock. In modern business, stock exchange system is electronic and 
it facilitates more stock trading. This proposition is widely supported 
amongst researchers including Naceur et al. (2006) who took annual value of 
stock traded over its market capitalization as a proxy for liquidity. They 
found out a strong negative relation between liquidity and dividend policy. 
 
Interrelation of Leverage & Dividend payments 
 The signaling theory explains that a firm paying more dividends 
sends a message about its strong financial performance which increases the 
credit standings of the firm. Moreover dividends paying companies decrease 
the information gap between managers and investors. Such firms can raise 
more debt hence dividend payment is determinant of leverage. Therefore on 
the basis of this argument it can be said that dividend payout positively 
impacts leverage. This relationship is supported by Bhaduri (2002). On the 
other hand leverage is a negative determinant of dividend payments. That 
means there is negative relation between leverage and dividend payments 
because firms with more debt prefer to retain more in order to repay loan 
instead of paying more dividends. Highly levered firms have more risk of 
financial distress and this risk may lead to less dividend payments. This 
argument is parallel to the arguments of Al-Malkawi (2007), Patra et al. 
(2012) and Al-Najjar (2009). 
 
Formation of Hypothesis 
Many hypotheses can be formed to test the relationship between 
independent and dependent variables. From literature review, one of the most 
important and significant variable found to be affecting both dividend 
payment and leverage of the firm is profitability. I have formed this 
hypothesis on the basis of pecking order theory which states that there is a 
negative relation between profitability and debt. The second hypothesis is 
formed to test the relation between profitability and dividend payment. I 
have formed this hypothesis based on signaling theory which states that firm 
will give more dividends to share holders if its profitability increases.  
 HO: There is no relation between leverage and profitability. 
 H1: There is negative relationship between leverage and profitability. 
 HO: There is no relation between profitability and dividend payments 
 H1: There is a positive relation between profitability and dividend 
payments 
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Table1. Variables and their description 
Variables Definitions 
Dependent variables 
Leverage  ( ) Total debt to total assets ratio. 
Dividend Payout Ratio (
) 
Dividend per share to book value per share ratio. 
Independent variables 
Profitability ( ) Profit before taxes to total assets ratio. 
Institutional Ownership (
) 
Shares owned by the institutional investors to outstanding 
common stocks ratio. 
Size ( ) Natural logarithm of sales. 
Asset Tangibility ( ) Fixed assets to total assets ratio. 
Liquidity ( ) Current assets to current liabilities ratio. 
 
  I specify the equation and put all the variables that affect total debt 
ratio and dividend payout on the right side of the equation. From finance 
theories it is known that total debt and dividend payment policy of the firm 
influence each other therefore the dependent variable in equation 1 (total 
debt ratio) is also being influenced by the dependent variable of equation 2 
(dividend payment) and vice versa. These are called simultaneous equations. 
The structural form equation of simultaneous model are given 
  If I run regression on these equations, the beta coefficients will 
suffer from severe simultaneous bias and will no longer be consistent. That is 
no matter how large my population sample is, the estimated coefficients will 
never converge to their true value. Econometricians employ two kinds of 
solutions to counter this problem. One solution is to use instrumental 
variable approach, the other one is to use reduced form equations and 
estimate it through OLS procedure. I have applied reduced form approach 
because of its wide use in econometric literature as well as its simplicity.  
 Now the reduced form equations are  
 Thus the functional form of these equations is semi log reduced form 
equations. I will run regression on these equations to determine impact of 
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variables on total debt ratio and dividend payout ratio. Amongst many 
independent variables some variables in both equations will be strong and 
significant and others not so. I can thus, based on empirical results 
confidently conclude about the variables jointly determining both DPO and 
TDR in the countries. 
The data  
 I have collected data from Indian and Pakistani non financial firms. 
The companies were chosen using random sampling from various sectors of 
the economy excluding only financial and banking sectors. The ratios of 
variables have been calculated by using financial statements of the 
companies. The data comprises of 130 firms from year 2010 till 2014. To 
ensure fair representation from both countries a total of 65 non financial 
firms were selected from India and the same number of firms was selected 
from Pakistan. 
Table2. Descriptive statistics 
Variable observation mean Std.dev. min  max 
Total debt ratio 650 0.4414505 0.27113 0 1.14 
Dividend payout  650 0.3506108 1.17285 0 9.4271 
ROA 650 0.2902714 0.538529 -1.3965 2.849 
Institutional 
ownership 
650 0.3533975 0.299942 0 0.9924 
LN sales 650 11.11207 5.05553 -2.813 19.205 
AssetTangibility 650 0.6092452 0.27374 0 0.9833 
Liquidity 650 1.473439 0.762165 0.1694 4.4431 
 
 The descriptive statistics show number of observations, mean, 
standard deviation, minimum and maximum values. The important point to 
note is that since the data is taken from across different sectors, therefore 
dispersion in data is high as shown by large standard deviation of some 
variables. For example standard deviation of dividend payout ratio is 1.172, 
while the minimum value for this variable is 0 and maximum is 9.42. This 
could be because some firms do not pay dividend at all, while other firms 
pay large dividend in some specific years. Similarly natural log of sales has 
high standard deviation of 5.055, which is due to the fact that there is high 
dispersion in sales of firms due to specific nature of sectors that firms 
operate in. Taking natural log of small value yields negative result so the 
minimum value of variable LN SALES is -2.813; while the maximum value 
is 19.205 and mean of the variable is 11.11.  The values of variable return on 
asset are also interesting to read. The minimum value is -1.39 while 
maximum is 2.849. This means that some firms suffer losses in given period 
while others have huge profits with little asset base. The dependent variable 
Total debt ratio has maximum value of 1.14 and minimum value of 0, 
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meaning that some firms are highly leveraged while others don’t use debt at 
all. While on average firms finance their capital with 44.14 percent debt.  
 
Empirical rasults 
 Dependent variable (Total Debt Ratio)  Newey-West standard errors 
reported 
            
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.3845276 0.0478571 8.03 0.0000 
 
-0.0610334 0.0339513 -1.80 0.073 
 
-0.0326044 0.0372719 -0.87 0.382 
 
0.0253182 0.0034351 7.37 0.0000 
 
-0.0632006 0.0643569 -0.98 0.326 
LIQit -0.1063303 0.0140394 -7.57 0.000 
 
 Dependent variable (Dividend payout ratio) Newey west standard 
errors 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.2619209 0.069584 3.76 0.000 
 
-0.0437685 0.0269887 -1.62 0.105 
 
0.047499 0.1981581 0.24 0.811 
 
0.0175234 0.0092102 1.90 0.058 
 
0.2473599 0.1432009 1.73 0.085 
LIQit -0.1770116 0.0530044 -3.34 0.001 
 
 The information from the tables can be used to interpret the 
hypotheses regarding relation of profitability with leverage and dividend 
payout. 
1) HO: there is no relation between leverage and profitability 
           H1: there is a negative relationship between leverage and profitability 
 The p-value from the first regression (total debt ratio as dependent 
variable) for the variable ROA (profitability) is 0.001 which is less than 5 
percent significance level; therefore I reject the null hypotheses of no 
relation between leverage and profitability. Thus regression results match 
with the theoretical proposition about negative relation between leverage and 
profitability. 
2) HO: there is no relation between profitability and dividend payments 
            H1: there is a positive relationship between profitability and dividend    
payments 
 The p-value from the second regression (dividend payout ratio as 
dependent variable) for the variable ROA is 0.626 which is greater than 0.05 
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(5% significance level); therefore I fail to reject the null hypothesis of no 
relation between dividend payout ratio and profitability. This result is 
contrary to my expectations from literature review and economic theory. 
 As the regression is run on panel data it is very likely that it might be 
suffering from autocorrelation. Therefore in order to check for its presence I 
have conducted Wooldridge (2002) test. The test results show that first 
regression (with dependent variable TDR) suffers from autocorrelation while 
the other regression does not. Another problem associated with panel data is 
heteroscedasticiy. In order to test for heteroscedasticity I have run Breusch-
Pagan/ Cook-Weisberg test. The test result shows that both regressions (with 
total debt ratio as dependent variable and dividend payout as dependent 
variable) suffer from heteroscedasticity, since the probability of chi2 (P-
value) is 0 which is less than 0.05; I reject HO of no heteroscedasticity. To 
counter the problem of both heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, I have 
calculated Newey-West heteroscedasticity consistent standard error. The 
powerful logic behind using Newey-West standard errors is based on the fact 
that it corrects the biased standard errors caused by heteroscedasticy and 
autocorrelation without changing the values of estimated coefficients. 
 I now interpret the regression results while considering established 
finance theories. According to pecking order theory I expect a negative 
relation between profitability and total debt ratio. My regression results 
suggest that this is true. The negative sign of beta  coefficient (-0.06103) of 
return on asset shows that as the firms experience an additional return of one 
rupee on their given assets, they tend to decrease their debt on their assets by 
0.06103 rupees holding other variables constant. Signaling theory suggests 
that profitability is positively related to dividend payments. The more 
profitable firm will give a positive signal to outside investors by giving away 
more dividends. The results from second regression (dependent variable 
dividend payout ratio) do not match the theory. The estimated coefficient of 
ROA is -0.0437.  The second variable, institutional ownership is seen as a 
monitoring tool over the management of the firm, it restricts the management 
in the same way as taking debt. According to Huddart (1993) and Maug 
(1998), there is a negative relation between institutional ownership and debt. 
This negative relation from theory is also proved from the regression results. 
The value of coefficient INST is -0.0326 from first regression (dependent 
variable TDR). It shows that if institutional investors buy one additional 
share of a firm, then the total debt ratio of the firm will fall by 0.0326 units 
holding all other variables constant. According to Bhaduri (2002); Titman 
and Wessels (1998), there exists a positive relation between firm size and 
debt. A large firm is less likely to suffer financial distress and so has the 
capacity to take more debt; therefore there is a positive relation between firm 
size and debt. I took natural log of sales as a proxy for firm size. The 
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regression results also prove a positive relationship. The estimated 
coefficient show that as sale of the firm additionally increases by one 
percent, the total debt ratio falls by 0.000253 units holding all other variables 
constant. To interpret the impact of asset tangibility on debt, I will compare 
my results with agency theory. According to agency theory, firms undertake 
debt in order to reduce agency costs, and tangible assets are used as 
collaterals for taking more debt. The firms with more tangible assets, fixed 
assets as a percentage of total assets can raise more debt by using fixed assets 
as collaterals. This argument is supported by many researchers in their 
studies including Titman and Wessels (1988). The variable in the regression 
does not match the assertions of researchers as the coefficient estimate is -
0.0632. This shows that as fixed assets given the total assets increase by one 
unit, the total debt ratio falls by 0.0632 units holding all other variables 
constant. The response of debt by changes in liquidity can be compared 
again from findings of agency theory. The theory asserts that firms with 
more liquidity will finance their projects without taking additional debt. This 
negative relation has been proved by many researchers while carrying out 
similar studies. For example Amidu and Abor (2006), in their study figure 
out a negative relation between the variables. My regression results also 
support this theory, the coefficient of liquidity is -0.10633. This shows that 
as liquid assets of firm given its current liabilities increase by one rupee, total 
debt of firm given its total assets decrease by 0.10633 rupees holding all 
other variables constant. Similarly negative relation between liquidity and 
dividend payment is proposed by many researchers. Naceur et al. (2006), 
Kania and Bacon (2005) proposed negative relation of liquidity with 
dividends. In a more liquid market where stock selling is quick, capital gains 
are preferred to dividends. My regression results also substantiate this 
assertion, the liquidity coefficient of -0.177 show that as firm’s liquid asset 
increase by one rupee, it pays 0.177 rupee less dividends to shareholders 
holding all other variables constant. 
 Now, I can finally answer my research question. What are the joint 
determinants of leverage (total debt ratio) and dividend payout ratio? From 
the first regression table we can see that return on assets, natural log of sales 
and liquidity all have p values less than 0.05. Therefore I reject null 
hypotheses of non significance of variables. However, very surprisingly all 
the variables in second regression with dividend payment as dependent 
variable turn out to be insignificant except the variable of liquidity which has 
a p value of 0.006 which is less than 0.05. Thus I can conclude that from 
empirical results only liquidity is the variable that jointly affects both 
leverage and dividend payment.  
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Conclusion 
 Two basic objectives are covered in this study. The first one is 
whether agency theory, pecking order theory, signaling theory and 
bankruptcy theory play a significant role in decision making process related 
to leverage and dividend policy in both the countries. The second one is 
which factors specifically affect both leverage and dividend policy in the 
countries. Regression results from first equation indicate that profitability, 
institutional ownership, tangibility and liquidity are negatively whereas firm 
size is positively related to the leverage. Notably only profitability, firm size 
and liquidity are found significant variables. The findings are consistent with 
agency theory and signaling theory, however one variable tangible asset has 
negative relation with debt which is not consistent with established finance 
theories. Regression results from second equation indicate that all the 
independent variables have positive relation with dividend payment policy 
except liquidity and profitability. All of these results are congruent with 
signaling and agency explanations except profitability. The more profitable 
firm will give more dividends to share holders in order to signal its financial 
strength to outside investors. However, my results do not match the signaling 
theory on this particular variable. Moreover, only one variable is significant 
in this regression and that is liquidity. Combining both regressions, I find out 
that liquidity is the only variable which is significant in both the regressions 
with the expected sign. Thus I can conclude that this variable is the joint 
determinant of both leverage and dividend payment. 
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